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One of the major difficulties in the critical study of International Relations is that what at first glance
may be considered a seemingly unrelated event, may in fact have profound implications for the
meanings, relations, and representational practices of the discipline and the phenomena that it seeks to
understand.  Over the past few years, long-standing evidence has come back into the spotlight that the
American Constitution was in part influenced by the Iroquois Confederacy’s Great Law of Peace.1 This
has sparked a lively and often nasty debate between on the one hand, those who find the idea to be
compelling and on the other, self-proclaimed conservatives like Rush Limbaugh and former Supreme
Court nominee Robert Bork, who have on the basis of little counter evidence, found the idea to be
completely without merit.2 Moreover, these conservative pundits argue that the ability of the idea of the
Iroquois influencing the US Constitution to gain any legitimacy is symbolic of a general decline,
initiated by the emergence of ‘political correctness’, in American society at large.3 
Those in academia who have presented compelling evidence of the interactions between the
Iroquois Confederacy and the founders of the American Constitution which plausibly points to the
impact of the former on the latter, have been pilloried by their colleagues. While there seems to be no
dispute within academia that the Iroquois political system embodied (and continues to embody) many
characteristics that we might associate with liberal democracy (e.g., political representation, gender
equality, individual freedoms), charges are still made that claims about the influence of the Iroquois on
the American political system are unscholarly, without rigour, dogmatic, lacking in ‘objectivity’, and a
practice of ‘myth-making’.4 The key question here is what does this have to do with international
relations?
The answer in part, is given that liberal democracy and the liberal democratic political system
are firmly entrenched in the American national psyche, any suggestion that they are not wholly an
‘American’ (or at least ‘Western’) product is tantamount to a full scale attack on US national identity and
the ontological presuppositions that form its foundations. This is particularly acute when Native
Americans are involved, for they have traditionally been seen as the uncivilized and savage ‘other’ on
the North American continent. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate that far from being just
window-dressing to (geo)strategic interests as argued by realists, or the ultimate guarantor of peace as
argued by democratic peace adherents, the American (and Western) conception of liberal democracy
creates the binaries necessary for the war-making practices of the United States and other like minded
allies such as Canada. 
In order to substantiate this controversial claim, I will begin by deconstructing the democratic
peace. Liberal democracy should be seen not just as a fundamental principle influencing the nature of
state government and domestic rule, but as a subjective tool to differentiate ‘friend’ from ‘foe’ and
‘opportunity’ from ‘threat’. The notion of liberal democracy is an integral part of what Roxanne Lynn
Doty has referred to as the ‘representational practices’ of the American (or Western) state.5
Viewing liberal democracy as an international relations practice within a representational
framework clearly illuminates three significant points with regards to the theory and practice of the
democratic peace that will be addressed in this paper. First, is through a representational deconstruction,
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the ontological nature of war and of peace become apparent. Second, because war and peace can be just
as much about ontology as strategy, war and peace may take place not only on the battlefield or in
diplomatic chambers but also in classrooms and media outlets (beyond the dissemination of propaganda)
through the production and reproduction of binaries and classification schemes. In other words,
devastating wars are often fought equally with words as with weapons; conversely, peace can be
achieved through discursive understanding as well as the laying down of arms. Therefore, Limbaugh and
Bork are not simply uninformed pundits, but are also combatants in an ontological battleground. Finally,
a representational view of the democratic peace helps to illustrate how democratic peace theory and
practice can and perhaps even must be silent about other versions of democracy like the Iroquois
Confederacy. 
Deconstructing the Democratic Peace6
The idea that democracies do not fight each other can be traced back to the writings of Immanuel Kant
over two hundred years ago in The Perpetual Peace; however, it was not until the early 1980s and the
writings of Michael Doyle that the idea received its first contemporary articulation.7 According to Doyle
and other adherents of the democratic peace, liberal democratic states have been able to maintain
peaceful relations amongst themselves, but are prone to wage war against non-liberal/democratic
regimes. Contrary to the gloomy predictions of realism, democratic peace adherents argue that liberal
democratic states have been able to transcend the imperatives of power politics and an international
system of anarchy in their relations with other liberal democratic states, and have not even attacked other
liberal democratic states when it may have been to their advantage.  Most though are willing to concede
that liberal democratic states will attack non-liberal democratic states (which they do not view as
legitimate actors) in attempts to spread liberal democratic values.
Because democratic peace adherents are firmly rooted in the positivist tradition of international
relations scholarship, providing empirical proof of the democratic peace has become a cottage industry in
many prominent American universities and research centres. Vast databases have been constructed of
historical dyadic relationships between states of the world as well as detailed breakdowns of incidents of
inter-state war. The conclusions reached are best signified in the work of Bruce Russett who has argued
that alleged wars between democracies (most of which took place in the 19th century) do not meet
‘rigorous’ criteria for a democracy and/or for war.8 These criteria of course are those subjectively chosen
by Russett. He defines a democracy as a system of government with a voting franchise for a substantial
fraction of citizens.9 War is defined by Russett as an interstate activity with one thousand battle
fatalities.10 Furthermore, Russett’s data claims to show that since the end of World War II, democratic
dyads have not only been able to avoid war, but are less likely to threaten to use force in the settlement of
their disputes.11 
Although providing empirical evidence of the democratic peace proved to be a challenge in
mainstream discussions of international relations, it pales in comparison to the efforts dedicated to
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explaining the democratic peace. As the idea of the democratic peace has become widely accepted in the
American/Western academic and (more importantly) policy-making circles, explanations of the
democratic peace have multiplied. These explanations can be broadly broken down into four main
categories including those that emphasize the structural constraints imposed on policy-makers in liberal
democratic regimes, those that argue shared norms between liberal democracies are the key, those that
assert that democracies are ‘satisfied powers’ unlikely to use force, and those that emphasis that
perceptions among liberal democracies are such that they represent each other as trustworthy. Of course,
these categories are not mutually exclusive and some of the most plausible explanations of the
democratic peace (like the one provided by John Owen) are able to combine elements of these categories
into expertly layered multi-dimensional stories of why democracies do not fight each other.12 
What is perhaps most interesting about democratic peace theory is not how its adherents have
attempted to explain the phenomenon, but its resonance with the general public and policy-makers.
Moreover, this pop-culture popularity has occurred despite the general perception within the wider
academic community that at best, it represents wishful thinking. More importantly, the nuances of
democratic peace theory have been lost as it has become enmeshed within popular political discourse in
the West. Thus, democratic peace theory has been transformed into a set of assertions that are constantly
repeated by commentators and policy-makers at the first signs of conflict in the international arena:
1. democracies are inherently peaceful unless unjustly attacked (or threatened) by
authoritarian regimes,
2. uses of force by democracies are justified because they are directed against real threats
launched by rogue actors intent on undermining the ‘democratic way of life’,
3. democracies by definition cannot go to war with one another (as a result of assertion 1),
4. the best way to ensure global stability and peace is to promote the spread of democracy.
The power of these four assertions is augmented by the fact that they are very easy to
comprehend and thus disseminate to the population at large; they muster support and help to provide a
basis of legitimacy for actions (including the large-scale use of violence) that may have otherwise
generated internal apathy if not opposition. In particular, the spread of democracy has been touted by
Western governments as the panacea to all global ills and has therefore been (mis)used as a rationale for
the use of force in several instances including NATO’s bombing of Serbia, the Coalition war against the
Taliban, and the invasion of Iraq. The irony that one ‘brand’ of democracy is being promoted in the Post-
Cold War world through the use of force rather than open discussion seems to be lost on many Western
observers.
Given the prevalence of the democratic peace thesis and its rhetorical impact both in the policy-
making community and popular Western political discourse, a critical international relations scholar is
faced with Robert Cox’s key theoretical questions: to paraphrase, ‘for whom and for what purpose has
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democratic peace theory been constructed’?13 From a slightly different angle, Ido Oren and Jude Hays
have argued “regularities of foreign policy can only be found where the analyst searches for them, and
US political scientists tend to devote a disproportionate share of their resources and energy to searches
around the categories of democracy and/or liberalism”.14 Thus far, too few international scholars have
been able or willing to ask why? By deconstructing the democratic peace as a representational practice,
possible answers will be found.
Democratic Peace Theory as a Representational Practice
Before undertaking a representational deconstruction of democratic peace theory, it is important to
distinguish this technique from the standard theoretical deconstruction common to critical international
relations scholarship. Where the standard theoretical deconstruction seeks to elucidate the assumptions,
presuppositions, and norms that have influenced the foundations of a particular theory, a representational
deconstruction of the sort attempted in this paper seeks to reveal how a theory has both moulded and
become enmeshed within ideas of self-identification and an ontological outlook which helps to define
identity. A standard theoretical deconstruction of the democratic peace would reveal just how much the
theory has in common with realism including positivist epistemology, states as the primary actors, the
assumption of anarchy, and the use of sovereignty as the predominant organizing principle of the
international system. Although a fascinating line of inquiry in its own right, I believe that a standard
theoretical deconstruction cannot answer ‘the who and for what purpose’ question as effectively as a
deconstruction of the representational practices of democratic peace theory.
According to Doty, the hegemonic dimension of global politics is inextricably linked to
representational practices, as hegemonic practices, are those which seek to create a fixedness of meaning
(in identity) that ultimately is impossible.15 What then are the hegemonic representational practices of
democratic peace theory?  Doty has divided practices of representation into seven crucial elements which
help to produce and reproduce difference: nodal points, naturalization, classification, surveillance,
negation, positioning, and the logic of difference. These will each be explored below in relation to
democratic peace theory and its two constitutive concepts, ‘democracy’ and ‘war’.16
As a representational practice, democratic peace theory needs nodal points around which to fix
meaning and establish positions to make predication possible.17  In other words, nodal points help to
affirm the identity of the ‘self’ in relation to the ‘other’, while negating the identity of the ‘other’ in
relation to the ‘self’.18 Two nodal points are of significance for democratic peace theory. First is the
conception of democracy that is common to democratic peace theory discussions. It emphasizes
procedural rather than substantive characteristics including elections and constitutions. When substantive
characteristics are discussed, the focus is on the negative freedoms of early liberal thought and first
generation human rights (e.g., freedom of religion, freedom from arbitrary authority, freedom of
opportunity). Most importantly, the conception of democracy being used as a nodal point is inherently an
American conception. It does not reflect how democracy is practiced in other states, and these
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differences in practice tend to be ignored in the literature unless the practice is considered ‘illiberal’.19
Thus, when Harvey Starr asks ‘how does one separate doves (unlikely to use force) and non-doves’ in
foreign relations, he responds by arguing that there is no reliable method other than dividing states on the
basis of whether they are a liberal democracy (i.e., American/Western) or not (i.e., non-American/non-
Western).20
The second nodal point around which the democratic peace is anchored is a conception of war. In
democratic peace theory, war is strictly an inter-state exercise.21  Intra-state warfare does not appear on
the democratic peace theory radar screen.22 Therefore, the use of force against domestic populations
(e.g., the American ‘War on Drugs’) or collective groups not recognized as state actors (e.g., the
Canadian Armed Forces versus Mohawk warriors at Oka, Quebec) are not problematic to the mainstream
idea of a democratic peace. In addition, democratic peace theory conceptions only recognize formal
declarations of war. As Tarek Barkawi and Mark Laffey argue:
US covert action to overthrow Third World elected governments shows that force is often used
by democracies against the extension of democracy. It is not seen as invalidating the democratic
peace because the US did not use its national military forces openly, but instead relied on clients,
mercenaries, and covert operatives. In this way, sovereign juridical conceptions obscure the
actual constitution of force, through imperial advice and support, and its use in projects of
informal empire.23 
Moreover, because war is typically defined in the democratic peace theory literature by the dictates of
the Correlates of War (CoW) database (which requires 1000 battle deaths), many possible instances of
war (and definite uses of force) such as the US invasion of Grenada can be easily ignored. It is also
important to note that democratic peace theory perceives war as the physical use of force for the
acquisition/maintenance of a strategic possession.24 Therefore attacks against ideology, religion, identity,
and culture that have typically been directed against minority and indigenous actors are not
acknowledged. 
Naturalization is a powerful aspect of the representational aspects of democratic peace theory by
making certain presuppositions beyond the realm of legitimate inquiry. In other words, democratic peace
theory has created background knowledge that is taken as true which entails an implicit theorization of
how the world works and the characteristics of all its inhabitants.25 First, liberal democracies are
naturalized so that they can be objectively differentiated from non-liberal/democracies.26  Second, the
fact that there is a relationship between the type of domestic political system and state character is
naturalized. More to the point though, the framework of this relationship shapes our thinking to naturally
view liberal democracies as predisposed towards peaceful interactions with each other and inherently
trustworthy within their relationships with other liberal democratic states. Therefore, liberal democracies
(read Western states) are peaceful towards all states except those who are ‘objectively’ determined to be
non-liberal/democratic regimes.27 The use of force against these types of states is justified because non-
liberal/democratic states are aggressive towards all states and completely untrustworthy. Therefore, these
Grayson g Democratic Peace Theory as Practice / 6
states are not legitimate global actors. Third, and perhaps most disturbingly, democratic peace theory
naturalizes peace as an aberration in international relations that must be explained rather than seeing
‘zones of peace’ as natural entities and war as the deviant circumstance. The irony here is that even the
democratic tradition within mainstream international relations has a Hobbesian impulse which trumps its
Lockean counterpart.
According to Doty, techniques of classification serve to reinforce that which has been
naturalized by placing things into categories in which they ‘naturally’ belong, often through the
construction of stereotypes which facilitate quick and easy differentiation/assimilation.28 Therefore, the
creation of classification categories which distinguish between liberal democracy and non-liberal
democracy as well as war and peace by their ‘natural’ characteristics are not merely tools designed to
make the analysis of complex phenomena easier, but also serve deeper ontological purposes. It is of little
wonder, as Doty contends, that these classifications are often hierarchical in nature with liberal
democratic states at the top of scale and other states in descending order depending on how many liberal
democratic characteristics they are perceived to exhibit.29  Thus states that emphasize the political and
civil rights of liberal thought rank higher than those who emphasize equally important social and
economic rights.
As a part of representational practices, surveillance operates to make subjects known and visible
objects of disciplinary power.30 From a Foucaultian perspective, procedures of observation and
examination enable states to be ‘known’ as democratic or non-democratic, placed within the appropriate
classificatory scheme, and acted upon in a prudent manner.31 Therefore, other states are monitored by
pro-democratic peace academic and policy-making circles to gauge their levels of liberal democracy.32
Furthermore, intensive case studies in democratic peace theory research enable ‘historical’ surveillance
of the liberal democratic nature of other states.33  
Negation is another fundamental aspect of representational practices. In the case of democratic
peace theory, negation focuses on erasing the histories of non-Western regions that create ‘spaces’ that
are later filled by the West through processes of facilitating ‘democratization’. Thus, the democratization
crusade is viewed as a mission of “deliverance and salvation rather than conquest and exploitation”.34
Barkawi and Laffey wisely remind their readers that:
 …it is forgotten that democracy became one of the major organizing principles of core states
during the creation of a global system of empires, forged and maintained by colonial wars.
Imperial power was pitted against local communities and peoples defending or seeking forms of
rule often more democratic than those imposed on them.35
It is these silences that help to maintain Western national identities as ‘democratic, civilized, and
enlightened’, while at the same time, reaffirming the corresponding ontology of a naturally hierarchical
international system based on these ‘objectively’ definable qualities. 
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According to Doty, all of the above representational practices help to position states relative to
one another; for the democratic peace theory discourse, it is concepts like liberal democracy, non-
liberal/democratic, dove-like, and war-mongering, that are used to position states vis-à-vis each other.36 
The democratic peace discourse and its rhetorical strategies which engage in the processes of positioning
are built upon the foundations of a “logic of difference which attempts to fix the positions of social
agents as stable, positive differences based upon foundational essences”.37 As a result, the subjective and
ontological nature of positioning to the casual observer remains obscured because the logic of difference
in democratic peace theory asserts that states objectively define themselves through their essences that
can only be known to the expert. From a Foucaultian perspective, the ‘invisibility’ of this exercise of
power is not surprising for:
…power is implicated in the very possibility of meaning. The naturalness of the world and the
categories through which we know it and its subjects are manifestations of power. Neither
subjects, nor subjectivity, nor structural social relations exist before the workings of power.38
In this respect, the democratic peace theory discourse differs very little from other historical discourses
(especially those centred around ‘civilization’) that have sought to separate an ‘us’ from a ‘them’.
Given the representation practices embodied within the democratic peace theory discourse, it is
best to view the interactions that it fosters as ‘imperial encounters’. According to Doty, ‘the term
imperial encounters is meant to convey the idea of asymmetrical encounters in which one entity has been
able to construct ‘realities’ that were taken seriously and acted upon and the other entity has been denied
equal degrees of kinds of agency’.39 The ‘reality’ of democratic peace theory has been defined by
Western representational practices outlined above. These representations have shaped the production of
knowledge and identities as well as making particular courses of action appear
possible/impossible/inevitable.40 Furthermore, to borrow a term from David Campbell, democratic peace
theory has constructed a new ‘geography of evil’ that (re)produces national identity while dictating what
courses of action are apt (i.e., conversion/force) when confronting the supposedly non-liberal/democratic
‘other’.41  To reiterate this point in a slightly different fashion, “the context of the democratic peace, then,
includes not only the advent of a zone of peace among core states, but also international relations of
domination and subordination in the periphery…”.42
As a result of this analysis, the answers to the questions of ‘for whom and for what purpose’ is
democratic peace theory designed are now evident but not surprising. Democratic peace theory and its
associated discourse is for the people of the US/West. Its purpose is to fix the American/Western
national identity as civilized, peacefully inclined, and democratic with the non-West by definition being
considered uncivilized, war-mongering, and authoritarian. Democratic peace theory also aids in the
justification of the American/Western world-view which perceives both democracy and war in a
particular fashion. In turn, these conceptions of democracy and war help to hide much of the sordid past
and present of the international relations of western liberal democratic states. They help to justify the
Grayson g Democratic Peace Theory as Practice / 8
unjustifiable and to legitimate the illegitimate. Of utmost importance is the ontological basis of these
international relations practices sanctioned by democratic peace theory and its associated discourse
within the popular political realm. This is the focus of the following section which examines the
existence of one of the empirical silences within democratic peace theory research and the consequences
of ignoring these important events.
Democratic Peace Theory and the Ontology of War and Peace
In Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War, Michael Shapiro tries to examine “the ways that
enmity-related global geographies and ethnoscapes emerge as collectivities, and how they try to achieve,
stabilize, and reproduce their unity and coherence”.43 Historically, the practice of war has emerged as one
the most enduring methods to attempt to fix national identities and ontological foundations. Victory in
war confirms all the positive subjective views of the ‘self’ while at the same time providing ‘proof’ of
the subjectively perceived inferior nature of the ‘other’. Conversely, defeat not only leads to
(geo)strategic losses, but also to a reappraisal of the national identity and deep questioning of the
foundations that helped define national identity. The American defeat in the Vietnam War provides an
excellent example of these identity/foundation casualties. Therefore, Shapiro argues that war is not just
(geo)strategic, but is also about the confrontation between competing ontologies.
As mentioned earlier, democratic peace theory and its surrounding discourse views war as an
activity waged by state actors in pursuit of (geo)strategic spoils (e.g., territory, resources, wealth), as well
as an activity arising over disputes of ‘ownership’ of spoils and/or perceived violations of sovereignty.
As John Vasquez has argued, “the situation that states in the modern global system are most likely to
deal with by the use of force and violence is one in which their territory is threatened....territorial
disputes provide the willingness to go to war”.44 Democratic peace theorists believe that liberal
democracies can peacefully manage these kinds of disputes amongst themselves; however, in
circumstances of dispute between a liberal democracy and a non-liberal/democracy, war is seen as
almost inevitable. Conventionally, this has been attributed to the inherently aggressive nature of the
‘authoritarian’ state, which prevents liberal democracies from trusting these states to adhere to peacefully
negotiated settlements. 
Yet, when democratic peace theory is viewed as a representational practice, war becomes
inevitable between disputing liberal democratic states and non-liberal/democratic states not because of
the aggressive nature of authoritarian regimes but because these situations are viewed as an opportunity
for liberal democratic states to engage in a ‘civilizing’ mission and reaffirm their national identity and
ontology by demonstrating their superiority in battle. This imperative becomes especially clear if we
abandon the traditional view of war contained within democratic peace theory and look at democratic
non-state/liberal democratic state disputes and the underlying ontological contestations that fuelled
them.45 Barkawi and Laffey have argued that currently “force is used in the service of defending and
expanding economic and to a lesser extent political liberalism (in the guise of democracy) beyond the
Grayson g Democratic Peace Theory as Practice / 9
liberal capitalist core”.46 From a historical perspective, the dispute between the Iroquois Six Nations and
the Canadian government over the Grand River territory during the first decades of the twentieth century,
provides an excellent example of the ontological impetus behind international relations practices and
how warfare can also be directed towards the annihilation of culture. 
The Plight of the Grand River Iroquois Nation
According to Ronald Wright, the Canadian government has been waging a hidden war against the
Iroquois since 1867.47 One the most important battlegrounds has been over the sovereign control of the
Grand River territory which is located on the Grand River, just south east of Brantford in Ontario. The
Canadian government has long considered Grand River to be a ‘reservation’ while the Grand River
Iroquois consider the territory to be an independent nation-state.48
Grand River was among one of the four regions along Lake Ontario given to the Iroquois by the
British in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War.49 Historians note that not only did the Grand River
territory serve as a symbol of British gratitude to the Iroquois for their support, but it also played a
strategic role as a buffer state between the United States and British North America.50 Although often a
source of dispute with Britain over its size and political status, Grand River emerged in the eyes of the
Iroquois as a sovereign political state run in the tradition of the Great Law of Peace.51
Slowly , due to land agreements with private farmers that became interpreted as legal
annexations, the Grand River state began to shrink.52 What started out as a 1200 sq mile territorial state
was reduced to 90 sq miles in less than one hundred years.53 With the threat of American invasion greatly
reduced by the late nineteenth century, government officials realized that Canada no longer needed any
‘Indian’ (sic) buffer states. Anxious to exercise complete control over Iroquois territory, the Canadian
government embarked upon a ‘civilizational’ process that amounted to replacing democratic indigenous
self-governments with ‘elected’ band councillors who were puppets of the Indian Affairs Department.
Iroquois territories tried to resist against the Canadian government; however, most efforts proved to be
futile. For example, in 1899, Akwesasne was overrun by the RCMP leaving one dead. Seven chiefs were
imprisoned and a puppet council was established. By contrast, Grand River was able to resist and
remained independent. During World War I, Grand River even provided troops (not under Canadian
control) to its old ally England.54 
Well aware of its precarious position after World War I, Grand River expressed its desire to
become a British protectorate. The Grand River Council argued that such a move did not threaten
Canadian interests and would only serve to reinforce sovereign control over the Grand River territory.
But in order to receive protectorate status, the Grand River state would have to clarify their political
status with the Canadian government. In 1920, the Canadian Supreme Court refused to hear the Iroquois
case. When the Grand River council took its grievances to the British Colonial Office, Winston
Churchill, the colonial secretary, said that it was a Canadian matter. As a result, Grand River entered
negotiations with the Department of Indian Affairs. In 1922, despite on-going talks, Grand River was
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raided. Shots were fired by police and further discussions were cancelled. Moreover, an Royal Canadian
Mounted Police detachment was placed within yards of the Grand River Council House.55 
By 1923, it was clear to the Grand River Council that the newly formed League of Nations was
the only remaining venue in which to have its sovereignty formally recognized. The council had a very
strong case including written treaties and wampum belts but needed a League member to act as a
sponsor. The Netherlands, Persia, Ireland, Estonia, and Panama all expressed an interest but Britain, on
behalf of Canada, threatened dire repercussions to anyone who would dare sponsor the Grand River
claim. Needless to say, the appeal was never heard.56
In 1924, armed police once again invaded Grand River. This time, the Six Nations parliament
was dissolved. Moreover, police seized treaty documents and sacred wampum belts by raiding wampum
keepers homes. Important evidence for the Grand River claim was thus rendered inaccessible. After
storming and taking control of the Council Long House, Indian Affairs appointed a new council;
however, to this day, this puppet-council has not been recognized by the majority of Grand River
residents. Instead, Iroquois sachems have sat as a government exiled in their own country.57 
The illegal annexation of Grand River is a result of a multi-faceted war waged by the Canadian
government on the Iroquois. It is often thought that the forced dissolution of native self-governments was
a part of grander strategy to eliminate the Iroquois and other Native Canadians through processes of
assimilation in order to preclude future land claims actions; however, closer examination also reveals an
ontological imperative devoid of any (geo)strategic imperative.58 Therefore, the Grand River situation
should also be seen as an assault on Iroquois culture through the delegitimation of the Grand Peace and
the seizing of wampum belts. To return to the early discussion of democratic peace theory, Grand River
represents one example of the efforts that liberal democracies will go to in order to remove a system of
governance (and the accompanying ontology) that is in any way different. Furthermore, Grand River
demonstrates that this is even the case when a state exhibits similar (though not identical) democratic
principles.  
Some historians claim that Duncan Campbell Scott, head of the Indian Affairs Department from
1913-1932, viewed himself as “Canada’s Kipling’ and strongly believed natives were in fact ‘lesser
breeds without the law”.59 Shapiro argues that such views at the time were “less an observation than an
ontological affirmation” of the superiority of European peoples over Native Americans.60 Moreover, he
argues that “the erasure of indigenous peoples, in fact and in representation, has been part of the self-
recognition by which state societies have territorialized and stabilized their identities”.61 Therefore, the
policy of assimilating the Iroquois was far more than a strategy to reap (geo)strategic gain. 
If we take Shapiro’s argument to its logical conclusions, it becomes clear that wars do not
necessarily have to be fought with weapons; words are also powerful means of destruction. The verbal
attacks of Limbaugh, Bork, and others of the same ilk seek to delegitimize and render the Iroquois (and
other Native Americans and Native Canadians) invisible through a discourse with its own
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representational practices much like the writings of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill did in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.62 Denial of the influence of the Iroquois Confederacy serves to
fortify the national identity and ontology of the United States (and other Western states) by reaffirming
the ‘uniquely’ American/Western contribution to modern liberal democracy. The intensity of the denials
is not surprising, for as Campbell has argued, representational practices become more overt during
periods of crisis.63 Therefore, as a theory and as a practice, the notion of a democratic peace is able to fix
the American national identity at a time when increases in levels of non-Western immigration to the
United States and the rise of multiculturalism contribute to an identity crisis that is subjectively
perceived by American conservatives like Limbaugh and Bork who fear that the line between the
domestic and the foreign is blurring. Therefore, the old saying about ‘sticks and stones’ does not
necessarily hold true in international relations. The construction of discourse and the representational
practices that sustain it can be a powerful weapon in the waging of war by legitimizing the ‘self’ and
delegitimizing the ‘other’. Alternate cultures and their corresponding ontologies can be wounded or even
killed. 
The Great Law of Peace
Given that I have argued that war serves an ontological as well as strategic purpose in international
relations, the converse should also hold true. In other words, there must also be an ontological
component to peace. For example, The Great Law of Peace  (the constitution of the Iroquois
Confederacy codified in wampum belts and an oral tradition) was as much about the affirmation of a
knowledge system and way of life as it was about ‘institutionalizing’ cooperation among the people of
the Six Nations. Accordingly, David Bedford and Tom Workman have argued that
although the Great Law is a text about international relations, it is also a document about living
well and how the relations between nations form an integral part of living well. Its seemly
oddities and peculiarities are therewith absorbed into a complete notion of what it means to live
properly.64 
Currently, one can see the research and references to supposed ‘zones of peace’ attributed to liberal
democracy in much the same light. Zones of peace help to reinforce the notion that liberal democracy is
good and just.65 Furthermore, little research is undertaken to determine if other forms of political
organization might also enjoy ‘zones of peace’. Thus, zones of peace are naturalized as only being
possible among liberal democratic states not by ‘fact’ but by the propagation of silence in conformity to
the hegemonic Western ontology. Therefore, Oren and Hayes present a compelling argument when they
state that
the virtual law of the democratic peace is not so special. If we were to classify states by
categories borrowed from non-Western cultural or socio-economic settings, we might discover
cross-national variations in conflict propensity that are no less substantial than those uncovered
by studies of democratic foreign policy.66
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Even when non-Western state systems are examined such as in the work of Neta Crawford on the
Iroquois Confederacy, it is only to transpose current democratic peace theory understandings in order to
demonstrate their universality.67 For example, Crawford constructs the Iroquois Confederacy as a
‘security regime’ in order to offer new lessons for current security regime theory. The conclusion
reached in the article that “the Iroquois League experience suggests that peace among nations may be
best secured over the long term if both democracy and the institution of a league/security regime are
present” demonstrates a fundamental violence of current international relations theory.68  ‘Our IR’
becomes ‘their IR’ in situations where it can reaffirm current ontological presuppositions. Perhaps a far
more beneficial practice for the current study of international relations would be to map instances where
‘our IR’ demonstrates a close likeness to ‘their IR’ while at the same time respecting the important
differences between them.69
Although the ontological nature of war and peace and the discursive method of waging war are
important insights into current international relations practices, we cannot forget one of the most
important aspects of the Iroquois struggle in Grand River. It is important to note how the history of
Grand River has been effectively silenced in past and current international relations discourses. For
example, I find it fascinating that Serbian actions in Kosovo generated a huge international debate,
interest, and action, while a similar situation (i.e., Grand River) remains unknown to most within
Canada, let alone the rest of the world. Thus, according to Shapiro, the Iroquois, like other groups
considered by mainstream international relations to be non-state nations, “have not had a place in the
history and cartography of warfare”.70 Furthermore, the discourse on war, like that of political economy,
has reinforced the geopolitical state centric map. As a result, Shapiro asserts that “within the historical
cartography of war, indigenous struggles still do not appear”.71 
Conclusion
It is of little wonder that Grand River is a forgotten site of struggle except in the Native
American/Canadian communities. First, it undermines the credibility of democratic peace theory by
illustrating that at best the democratic peace is selective in its operation through representational
practices that presuppose what political forms are ‘democratic’ and what assumptions can be made about
them. Not only does democratic peace theory limit the types of states that can be considered democratic,
but more importantly, it limits democratic characteristics those political entities it recognizes as states. 
At worst, Grand River clearly demonstrates that liberal democracies can be aggressive even towards
other democracies.72
Second, to give Grand River (and other similar historical circumstances) a voice in the study and
practice of international relations would severely undercut our perceptions of liberal democracies as
civilized, predisposed towards peace in inter-democratic relations, and naturally reasonable, thereby
presenting clear challenges to conventional thinking. Therefore, one of the roles of the critical
international relations scholar should be to expose these injustices and the representational practices that
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make them possible; it is quite likely that there are many ‘Grand Rivers’ and each should be given a
voice. As Doty has argued, it is only by revealing “the contingent and unstable nature of the systems of
difference” and exposing the “foundational essences as arbitrary constructions made possible by the
power/knowledge nexus” that these kinds of practices can be overcome.73 By simply being prepared to
actively listen to the ‘other’, to engage in processes that will foster intersubjectivity, progressive
transformation both inside and outside the ‘self’ can be achieved.  
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